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The concept of the master-signifier has been subject to a variety of applications in
Lacanian forms of political discourse theory and ideology critique. While there is much
to be commended in literature of this sort, it often neglects salient issues pertaining
to the role of master signifiers in the clinical domain of (individual) psychical economy.
The popularity of the concept of the master (or “empty”) signifier in political discourse
analysis has thus proved a double-edged sword. On the one hand it demonstrates how
crucial psychical processes are performed via the operations of the signifier, extending
thus the Lacanian thesis that identification is the outcome of linguistic and symbolic as
opposed to merely psychological processes. On the other, the use of the master signifier
concept within the political realm to track discursive formations tends to distance the
term from the dynamics of the unconscious and operation of repression. Accordingly,
this paper revisits the master signifier concept, and does so within the socio-political
domain, yet while paying particular attention to the functioning of unconscious processes
of fantasy and repression. More specifically, it investigates how Nelson Mandela operates
as a master signifier in contemporary South Africa, as a vital means of knitting together
diverse elements of post-apartheid society, enabling the fantasy of the post-apartheid
nation, and holding at bay a whole series of repressed and negated undercurrents.
Keywords: discourse, discourse of the master, Lacanian psychoanalysis, Mandela, master-signifier,
psychoanalysis, repression, signifier
INTRODUCTION
There is a good deal of excellent literature that explores the Lacanian notion of the master-signifier
from the perspective of political discourse theory and ideology critique (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985;
Žižek, 1996; Stavrakakis, 1997, 1999; Laclau, 2007). While much is to be gained from this literature,
it often neglects salient issues pertaining to the role of master-signifiers in the clinical domain of
individual psychical economy. However, the popularity of the concept of the master (or empty)
signifier in political discourse analysis and ideology critique has proved a double-edged sword. On
the one hand it demonstrates how crucial psychical processes are performed via the operations of
the signifier enabling thus a de-psychologizing of such processes of identification. On the other, the
use of the master-signifier concept within the political realm to track discursive formations and the
functioning of ideology tends to distance the term from application in the realm of subjectivity and
as an element in the functioning in the unconscious. In short: the master-signifier seems, all too
often, more a concept derived from discourse theory than from clinical psychoanalytic practice.
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“IN WAYS I CANNOT SAY”
As way of introducing the concept of the master-signifier, one
might imagine the following scenario. You are accosted by a
camera crew who ask to film you as you list in a few words
what is of greatest significance in your life and why. “What,” the
interviewer asks you, “would you be prepared to give your life
for?” True enough, not everyone would be reduced to a state
of stumbling inarticulacy by such a situation. Many might quite
happily offer an initial response (“My children,” “The church,”
“My country,” “Science,” “Humanity,” etc.). Then again, even
those who are able to summon up an appropriate response will
doubtless be dogged by a sense of the inadequacy of their words,
by their own inability to fully articulate the reasons for the
depth of this libidinal investment. Added to this is the inevitable
prospect that the words one uses in such situations will seem
hopelessly derivative, abstract and formulaic, devoid of any real
personalized significance.
Such a situation would be made even more trying should
the interviewer press on and on, interrogating each given
belief—be it a deeply-held personal, political or even spiritual
commitment—with the hystericizing prompt: “But why?,” “Why
do you believe that?” The unavoidable conclusion to such an
unrelenting line of questioning would be a circular—and no
doubt exacerbated—retort: “Because I do!” Such a retort, like
that of the exasperated parent’s “Because I said so!” is sometimes
all that can be offered in order to hold a deluge of questions—
and inadequate answers—at bay. This situation calls to mind
the age-old poetic dilemma: the difficulty of putting into words
the reasons one loves one’s partner, one’s family, one’s country,
etc. The impossibility of ever fully answering such a question
seems perhaps self-evident: being in love presents us with
a self-justifying condition which always exceeds the reasons
I might give for being in love. Indeed, the reasons I love
someone (or something) can never be wholly rationalized or
exhausted by a string of signifiers, partly because such signifiers
refer on and on to other signifiers without ever “hitting the
real.”
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE SIGNIFIER
We are presented here with the apparent inadequacy of the
signifier; the problem of slippage from one term of reference—
unable in itself to fix a given meaning—to another, and then
another, and so on ad infinitum in an indefinite process which
fails to arrest the slide of deferred meaning. This scenario is
nicely invoked by Lacan’s (2006) at first curious definition of the
signifier: “a signifier is what represents the subject to another
signifier” (2006, p. 694). There is no naïve psychological realism
here; it is not the case that the signifier can transparently
represent the subject as he or she really “is.” It is rather the case
that what one “is,” or, more accurately, the signifiers that one uses
to portray who one is (“business-like,” “fair-minded,” “decisive,”
“dedicated”) are, as in the example of a politician’s self-portrayals,
related still to other signifiers (“presidential,” “exceptional,” etc.).
“The signifier does not provide a guide to reality,” insistsMiller
(2016), “but presents myriad relations with other signifiers.” A
signifier, moreover, is defined by other signifiers, indeed, “by its
relation to the chain of all other signifiers.”
[S]ignifiers slide along, metonymy gets away from real objects,
language lives on its own terms, existing in dimensions far
removed from signifieds, doing far more than simple describing
them. This is where the subject exists; these are the laws to which
we are subjected (Miller, 2016)
In such situations where more can always be said, our best option
is, in effect, to tie a knot in discourse. The self-referring quality of
a given oft-stressed signifier has to suffice when no over-arching
explanation can be given (“Well that’s Jeffrey for you. . . !,” “Boys
will be boys. . . ”). This, after all, is what self-referential answers
do: they don’t as much provide sufficient reasons, as loop back
on what has already been said, and elevate one signifier over
others (“My children mean everything to me,” “For me it boils
down to faith,” “Evolution does not adhere to the principles
of Christianity”). The signifier here over-reaches its signified; it
exceeds what it literally signifies to perform a different discursive
function, that of drawing a line, halting a sequence of inadequate
explanations by the imposition of a master-signifier (“We know
it is true because science tells us so”).
In this way such responses enable a temporary point of fixity;
they ground a point of belief and/or authority. Bracher (1994) has
this tautological logic in mind when he explains how speakers
use certain signifiers—master-signifiers—“as the last word, the
bottom line, the term that anchors, explains or justifies the claims
or demands contained within the message” (p. 112). Receivers of
communication respond to master-signifiers similarly: “whereas
other terms and the values and assumptions they bear may
be challenged, master-signifiers are simply accepted as having
a value or validity that goes without saying” (p. 112). Master-
signifiers often appear then as those unarguable aspects of a
discursive position, as those self-validating points of attachment
to a broader ideological or personal worldview.
THE MASTER-SIGNIFIER IN THE FIELD OF
IDEOLOGY
Helpful as the foregoing illustration may have been, it begs
further elucidation. This can be done in two phases: by examining
a series of basic themes in political/sociological uses of the term
and then by turning to the more clinical literature. In this way
we will provide a basis for understanding the concept both in
its societal and subjective domains of application, while also
pointing to certain of the tensions arising between these two areas
of application.
Within any discursive network or “system of signs” there
are certain privileged signifiers, what Lacan (1993) initially
referred to “points de capiton,” nodal-points, which function to
“button down” meaning and ensure the smooth exchange of
signifiers. Such signifiers are evident at the level of everyday
speech, typically as those oft-repeated or affectively-loaded terms
which function to ground a given system of references. These
signifiers, paradoxically, assume a disproportionate importance
in relation to surrounding signifiers. Any number of examples
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can be supplied here, from master-signifiers operating at
an overtly political and ideological societal level (as in the
American context: “9–11,” “Freedom,” “Our troops”), to the
more idiosyncratic range of master-signifiers as they operate
at the level of individual subjectivity to play an organizing
functioning in psychical economy. Such signifiers operate to
integrate a disparate array of elements, to fashion effects
of legibility out of an otherwise indeterminate (and often
distressing) set of discursive elements. In his Seminar III Lacan
described the role of the master-signifier in the following
terms: “Everything radiates out from and is organized around
this signifier. It’s the point of convergence that enables
everything that happens in this discourse too be situated” (1993,
p. 268).
A recent definition of the master-signifier—which serves
us both as a summary overview and as a basis for critical
comparison—is found in The Žižek Dictionary:
[B]ecause signifiers refer only to other signifiers, this produces a
seemingly endless chain of references. . . [T]his seemingly infinite
sequence of referral can be fixed or anchored only through the
intervention of a. . . ’nodal point’. . .which ‘quilts’ them, stops their
sliding and fixes their meanings. . . this nodal point. . . in the series
of signifiers is the “master-signifier”—a signifier that, although
essentially no different from any other signifier, is situated in
such a way that it masters the entire sequence of referral by
providing a kind of final. . . guarantee of meaning. It is able to
do this. . . not because it possesses some special significance. . . but
simply because it is able to halt the process of referral by the
empty gesture of referring only to itself. This “reflective” signifier
is nothing more than a kind of cul-de-sac in the chain of
equivalences. . . .‘beneath’ the alleged unity of the field of meaning,
there is only a. . . self-referential, performative gesture (Gunkel,
2014, pp. 190–191).
This definition, admirable in its succinctness and its ability to
synthesis the, is indicative in another way also: no mention is
made either of the operation of the unconscious or of the fact
that the discursive nodal-point of the master-signifier represents
equally a nodal-point of affect, a point of passionate investment.
A somewhat different account of how the “empty signifier”
functions in the consolidation of groups is presented in
Laclau’s On Populist Reason. Laclau (2004) notes how under
certain circumstances a given signifier, without ceasing to be
particular in what it signifies, “assumes the representation of
an incommensurable totality” (p. 70). This signifier is thus
“split between the particularity which it still is and. . . .[a]
more universal signification” (p. 70). This operation whereby
a particular signifier takes up the role of “incommensurable
universal signification” is, for Laclau, that of hegemony. Such
a task of hegemonic identity requires an empty signifier in
which its “own particularity” comes to attain an “unachievable
fullness” (p. 71). In contrast to the foregoing definition,
Laclau does bring libidinal investment into the picture.
The “fullness” of the master-signifier cannot be directly
represented as such; “a hegemonic totalization requires a radical
investment. . . the affective dimension plays a central role here”
(p. 71).
FIGURE 1 | Discourse of the master (based on: Lacan, 1972, p. 40).
THE SIGNIFIER IN RELATION
TO OBJECT A
One of the reasons why Lacan’s work on the signifier cannot be
thought of as merely linguistic, is that he takes into account the
dimension of the drive, or libidinal investment. This not only
means that using the signifier entails libidinous gratification, but
above all, that what sets our use of signifiers in motion, is a
fundamental deadlock: humans have no automatic harmonious
relations with one another, exemplified in the idea il n’y a
pas de rapport sexuel—there is no such thing as a sexual
relationship (Lacan, 1971). That is to say, we need to take into
account both the forms of libidinal enjoyment produced in and
through speech, and the fact that such linguistic processes are
set in motion by an impasse, an impossibility at the level of
communication and signification. Indeed, the master signifier
only obtains its privileged position in discourse because it comes
as an answer to this fundamental deadlock; to the fact that
“spontaneous” human relations are marked by an overwhelming
jouissance we shy away from. In terms of the formula of the
discourse of the master (Figure 1), this deadlock is expressed
by the absence of an arrow between the truth underlying this
discourse (subjective division—$) and the product it entails
(object a, the ever elusive object-cause of desire). The fullness
and promise of significance the master-signifier (S1) brings to the
fore, is an answer to a fundamental dis-order at the level of the
drive.
Interestingly, by pointing out that the discourse of the master
produces an object a, which further strengthens the use of the
master-signifier (expressed by the arrow between S1 and a),
Lacan posits that inside discourse a libidinous element fuels the
use of the master signifier. Our first example of the interviewer
and the camera crew made this clear, by stressing the role of a
passionate attachment that simultaneously drives and yet defies
communicability. In producing (master-)signifiers we behave as
if we are seen and listened to. We make sense of what we do
and say by acting as if we are actors in ours own lives. We think
of ourselves as individuals that might be heard or be seen, and
therefore feel the need of stating who we are or what we want.
Indeed, the object a is the senseless gaze or voice we presume at
the level of the other1. This element has a disturbing effect, and
fuels the production of master-signifiers.
1While the object a can be situated at the level of the other, it should not be seen
as an element that attunes subject and other. On the contrary, what makes the
neurotic situate the object a at the level of the other, is a deep uncertainty as to
what the other wants. The absence of a harmonious link provokes the question of
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IN THE NAME OF MANDELA
Collectively, a name starts to function as a master-signifier when,
despite the predominance of a general consensual meaning, it
comes to signify a great many things to a great many people,
all of whom remain in some way identified with—or against—
what it is thought to signify2. The signifier in question—Margaret
Thatcher, Martin Luther King, Chairman Mao, Sigmund Freud,
George Washington, Pope John Paul II, Jesus Christ—anchors
an array of beliefs and makes a type of (political, religious,
ideological) subjectivity possible. In the absence of such a societal
master-signifier there is no committed or believing subject, no
subject of the group, indeed, no viable group or constituency
at all.
Mandela As….
The name Mandela works in just such a way in post-apartheid
South Africa (see for example Barnard, 2014). Evoked by
multiple constituencies, Mandela’s legacy is pinned to the agendas
of divergent interests, and can no longer be assigned any
singular meaning. What this means then is that Mandela
represents a point of hegemonic convergence in which a
variety of incompatible values and identifications overlap.
Frederickson’s (1990) comment that Mandela succeeded in
fulfilling a symbolic role as the “embodiment of the nation
that transcends ideology, party, or group” (p. 28) has by now
become a historical commonplace. For some Mandela represents
the benign, forgiving father of the nation, the embodiment of
hope and racial reconciliation; for others Mandela is the radical
protagonist of the armed struggle, the revolutionary icon of the
African National Congress; for yet others Mandela is a largely
de-politicized figure, the commodity image adorning countless
accessories and experiences of the “new” South Africa. In terms of
Lacan’s discourse of the master, this multiplicity is reflected in the
upper level of the formula (Figure 1: S1→S2): master signifiers
give rise to various narratives, by means of which meanings arise
that might be powerfully divergent.
…Transcendent Signifier
The magic of the master-signifier in the ideological field is that
it is able to knit together different constituencies, appealing
equally, albeit in very different ways, to a variety of classes
who are otherwise opposed in their political agendas. The point
of course has frequently been made that Mandela represents
fundamentally different things to whites and blacks in South
Africa. Nxumalo (2013) for instance comments that “[T]here is a
fundamental departure between blacks and whites on what takes
precedence in all things that make up this icon called Mandela.”
True as this no doubt is, such a contention does not so much
oppose as support our argument. Why so? Well, such ideological
divergences may ultimately be less important that the fact that
whites and blacks find in Mandela a shared reference-point,
the other’s desire, elicited, for example, by the gaze of he who looks at me, or the
silence of the one listening to what I say.
2We include counter-identification as itself a form of identification here, such that
even rejections of the historical figure or master signifier in question may be said
to maintain a tact (indeed, negative) identification with what is being rejected.
a common denominator through which their often differing
interests may be mediated.
Such a master-signifier enables communication where
previously none may have been possible; it represents the
possibility that various social antagonisms might (however
temporarily) be overcome. It is in this way that a master-signifier
makes a type of social bond possible. Historically, this much
seems difficult to dispute: Mandela more than any other signifier,
proved capable of lending moral purpose and meaning to
South Africa’s political transition, to the multiple contradictions
underlying the post-apartheid era. This is perhaps what proved
so anxiety-provoking for many South Africans about Mandela’s
declining health in late 2013: the prospect that the country would
lack a crucial “race mediator,” i.e., a political figure who not only
speaks powerfully to black and white groupings, but who also
enables them to speak with and to one another.
…Empty Signifier
Laclau (2004, 2007) prefers to refer to empty as opposed to
master-signifiers. Doing so draws attention to the fact that
master-signifiers have no intrinsic or essential meaning, and that
they permit for an endless succession of varying applications
and extensions. In the operation of the master-signifier, says
Stavrakakis:
a particular signifier is called to incarnate a function beyond its
concreteness, it is ‘emptied’ from its particular signification in
order to represent fullness in general and to be able to articulate
a large number of heterogeneous signifiers. . . such an empty
signifier. . . serves as a point de capiton uniting a whole community
(1999, p. 80).
We understand then that master-signifiers can never be totalized
or exhausted, that they “sustain the identity of an ideological
field beyond all possible variations of positive content” (Žižek,
1989, p. 87). The signifier Mandela, for example, remains ever
able to accommodate fresh articulations; it can be appended
to a seemingly limitless stream of post-apartheid objects and
aspirations. Mandela we might say, is effervescent, an unending
signifier, a point of reference for a figure who ascended to the
realm of pure symbol. And here the key paradox underlying
the concept comes to the fore: the more a master-signifier is
heaped with imaginary contents and meanings, the more open
and vacuous it becomes.
On the one hand then we have Mandela as an over-arching
signifier, the signifier that seemingly encapsulates all that is of
value in the post-apartheid context. Yet Mandela is also, a kind
of nothingness, a signifier devoid of any absolute or definitive
meaning, a signifier that exists at the site of the impossibility of
ever saying it all. This much is certainly true: Mandela remains
forever indeterminate; one never knows in any final sense what is
being invoked when this signifier is being put to use. Mngxitama
(2014) points out: “WhatMandela, the symbol of freedom, stands
for is so vague that anything can be pegged on him.”
…Positivisation of a Void
Of course, as already intimated, the indeterminacy of Mandela is
less important than the fact that a system of signification requires
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a centering-point, a navigational principle, in reference to which
all surrounding signifiers gain co-ordinates ofmeaning and value.
Nevertheless, how are we to make sense of the fact that a master-
signifier is simultaneously depleted of and yet overflowing with
meaning, that—differently put—emptiness and symbolic density
here coincide? Simply enough, perhaps, by suggesting that the
master-signifier is a signifying operation in which the nothingness
presented by the object a is effectively turned into a plenitude of
significance. The impossibility of saying it all is transformed into
a surplus.
Glynos (2001) makes a similar point in considering how any
complex ensemble of discursive elements—constructions of a
nation for example, or of a given society—come to attain a type
of relative closure and meaning. Society, for example, lacks an
ultimate signifier with which to make it complete:
[N]othing positive can be said about the “truth” of society except
that it is incomplete—in Lacanian terms, that there is a “lack
in the symbolic Other.” Thus, society exists as a totality only
insofar as the social subject posits its existence as such through
the mediation of empty signifiers (2001, p. 197).
It is in the operation of master-signifiers, continues Glynos,
that epistemological incapacity is transformed into a positive
ontological condition. We use such master-signifiers every day,
without a second thought (“America,” “society,” “men,” “history,”
etc.). Such signifiers, should, by virtue of their vagueness,
their breadth of abstraction, surrender to a type of amorphous
meaninglessness. Indeed, one might expect them to buckle under
the weight of the signifying load heaped upon them. Yet this does
not happen.
What seems to be the impossibility of master-signifiers, the
fact that no one totalizing or exhaustive definition can be
allocated to them proves also to be their condition of possibility.
Put differently: a prospective master-signifier needs to be over-
stretched, burdened with the task of “incommensurable universal
signification” before it comes to operate as such. It is only by
being over-loaded in this way that a signifier begins to exceed
the work of mere signification and becomes “super-charged,”
self-referential. Hence the initially puzzling idea that a master-
signifier does not in fact signify anything at all, beyond itself.
A master-signifier is in this sense akin to a recursive loop in
the functioning of signification itself. The signifying impulse gets
caught in a self-affirming pattern, in a repetitive circuit, hence
the circular, self-instantiating grounds of such “transcendent”
terms. It is this endless self-referral of master-signifiers which
means that they come, paradoxically, to “count” more than the
surrounding signifiers upon which they operate.Lacanian theory
thus both extends and yet departs from Structuralism. As Dolar
(1999) explains:
[A]ny notion of structure, far from being simply differential, a
balanced matrix of permutations (as in Levi-Strauss) necessarily
gives rise to a ‘Master-signifier’, a structural function that power
gets hold of, but which is in itself empty, a pure positivisation of a
void (p. 87)
…Social Fantasy
If we appear to have drifted too far toward theoretical abstraction,
too far away from our case study of Mandela as master-signifier,
then consider Nuttall’s (2013) commentary on the mortality of
the former South African president:
With the fact of his late old age comes the sense that [Mandela]
marks a deep void at the heart of a place that has always struggled
to mask what it feels might be an emptiness at its center, that has
struggled to define itself as a nation and to draw together its many
fragments into a sustained sense of commonality, in the wake
of a long racist past. We approach alongside him the anxiety or
anguish that South Africa is neither a concept nor an idea—just a
physical place, a geographical accident (Nuttall, 2013).
Mandela, thus approached, is the signifier that covers the void
of meaning that is South Africa. One appreciates how, in late
2013, Mandela’s immanent death may have been thought to
represent the end of the fantasy, the point at which the concept
of South Africa ceased to work as anything other than an
imaginary construct. Perhaps it is the case—easy enough to
imagine if Mandela’s legacy were erased from history—that,
following Nuttall (2013) “South Africa” is no more than the name
for a set of historical contingencies to which no historical essence,
no grand march of progress can rightly be said to apply.
The above reference to fantasy, to the mythical dimension
of Mandela as master-signifier, is apt. As Stavrakakis (1999)
observes, the symbolic construct articulated via a master-signifier
“can function properly only within a certain fantasmatic frame;
the empty signifier can function only as an object petit a” (p.
81), that is, in relation to the object-cause of desire which
holds a given fantasmatic scenario in place. A master-signifier,
in other words, is never merely objective in its meaning and
value, but is animated rather by belief, by the imagination,
the libidinal and fantasmatic aspirations of those who have
invested in it. There is thus some truth in political evaluations
that suggest that Mandela’s greatness “is mainly a creation
of the collective imagination” (Beresford, 2004). We might
rephrase this idea psychoanalytically simply by noting that
Mandela—and master-signifiers more generally—are targets of
intense transference reactions. In speaking of Mandela as master-
signifier, we convey not only that Mandela has become a focal-
point of multiple subjective investments, but the effect of a shared
fantasy underwriting a given view of social reality.
…and Retroactive Principle of Articulation
We would be remiss if were not to mention the retroactive
dimension of master-signifiers. That there are cardinal points
in discourse, areas of marked libidinal intensity, is always
already the result of master-signifiers ordering the field of
signification and affect alike. This is particularly salient in
the case of Mandela, where—in line with the narrative role
typically accorded the former president—it is easy to fall prey
to the illusion that Mandela was always destined to assume
the role of the unifying, transcendent signifier of the post-
apartheid nation. Contrary to such assumptions we should
insist: there was nothing pre-destined about the success of
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Mandela as pre-eminent master-signifier of South Africa’s “long
walk to freedom” (Mandela, 1994). The retroactive effect of
historical order—indeed, of narrative cohesion—is precisely the
result of a master-signifier knitting together the disarray of
contingent signifiers and events and producing a sense of cogency
and inevitability. This helps us make a further general point:
as components of ideology, master-signifiers don’t so much
eliminate opposing terms as re-articulate them. Rival ideological
terms come thus to be re-integrated, put into a different set of
signifying relations. This is a situation in which nothing can be
said to have changed (in the sense of new content being added
to the discourse) yet where everything is, nevertheless, utterly
transformed (there has been a reshuﬄing of discursive elements
under the ascendency of a new master-signifier).
Such a reshuﬄing of discursive elements is apparent in
the changing historical role of Mandela as master-signifier.
What had for many years been a master-signifier within
apartheid ideology, a signifier predominantly associated with a
variety of others—“communist threat,” “anti-white,” “violence,”
“terrorist”—eventually came to operate as the compositional
center, the focal-point of the discourse of the new South Africa.
It should be clear then that the role of the master-signifier in
arranging a discursive field is anything but a once-and-for-all
operation. It is an instance rather of how signifiers, which still
play a role in other discourses, come to be rearranged, subjected
to a new constellation.
THE MASTER-SIGNIFIER IN PSYCHICAL
ECONOMY
We stressed above the need to grasp the role of master-signifiers
not only as elements within the functioning of political discourse,
but as components in the psychic economy of subjects. A master-
signifier, after all—as we have seen—is fueled by an object a,
and animated by subjective belief, by the fantasies and desire of
those who have invested in it. This theoretical context, of how
master-signifiers operate at the level of psychical economy, is,
we would argue, irreducible in an adequate understanding of
the concept. A master-signifier’s strength, in this respect, is not
merely linguistic—or so we might argue—but also affective in
nature, a question of passionate attachments, of the libidinal ties
and subjective identifications that it gives rise to. We might put
it this way: the operation of master-signifiers itself entails a type
of libidinal economy inasmuch as it involves a distribution and
arrangement of affects.
Here though we must proceed cautiously. From a Lacanian
perspective, linguistic operations are the very stuff of psychical
functioning. So, (mass) identification, as we have intimated
above, is as much a symbolic and political as it is a psychical
and subjective process; it is as much about the unconscious
investments of individual subjects as about the consolidation of
hegemonic forms of discourse. The repeated Lacanian injunction
to attend to the signifier, to the symbolic, indeed, to the trans-
subjective, means that social and individual are never easily
separated. In much the same way, the question of affective
bonds should not be seen as extrinsic to the role of signification.
“Affect is not something external, added to the symbolic, but an
internal component of it” (Laclau, in Glynos and Stavrakakis,
2010, p. 235). This is to say that the affective charge of a given
signifier or representation does not exist outside of the realm
of signification. Affects should be grasped as the outcome of
relations between signifiers. Laclau continues:
Affect is not some vague emotion external to signification, for
it can only constitute itself on the basis of overdetermining a
signifying chain. . . the signifier ‘rat’ [in Freud’s case of the Raman]
is so affectively overcharged because it evokes—overdetermines—
a plurality of currents of unconscious thoughts—money, sex, the
father, and so on (Laclau, in Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2010, p. 235).
Affect must thus be approached as an internal component
of signification, rather than understood as something added
to the operations of signification. Any rigid demarcation
between affect and representation, signifier and jouissance,
must thus be brought into question: “the distinction between
affect (cathectic investment) and the symbolic is. . . intra- and
not extra-discursive” (Laclau, in Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2010,
p. 239). In Lacan’s discourse theory the relation between the
master signifier (S1), the other signifiers (S2) and the object
a expresses the internal nature of this affective relationship.
Signifying articulation itself (S1→S2) creates the insistence of
a libidinal element (a) at the level of the not-said, which
further gives rise to positing a master-signifier. It is helpful
now to switch to a clinical focus on the master-signifier in
relation to the subject; doing so brings to light aspects of
the concept that may—and typically do—remain otherwise
neglected.
S1, S2, AND THE DIVIDED SUBJECT
Strictly speaking, it makes no sense to speak of a “master-
signifier” in a way that implies it can be disengaged from the
multitude of other signifiers of which it is a part. Lacan’s quasi-
mathematical notion of the 1960’s emphasizes as much: a master-
signifier (S1) is always itself contingent on a dispersed array of
elements (S2) that come, retroactively, to operate as a bounded
field of knowledge. Hence Fink’s (1995) description of themaster-
signifier as “the nonsensical signifier” which is “brought into
the movement of language. . . “dialecticized” through the action
of various S2s” (p. 75). Indeed, logically S1 gives rise to the
articulation of S2, but in terms of the signification process S2
retroactively determines S1.
Crucially however, not only does the passage from S2 to S1
render a disorganized set of signifiers legible, it also arranges
a set of otherwise disparate signifiers into practicable forms of
knowledge (savoir faire). Such a process, crucially, implies a
subject, precisely the subject for whom the relation of knowing
thus produced becomes operable (the subject “that represents a
signifier for another signifier”). S1← S2 is thus a type of Lacanian
shorthand for subjectification. This is axiomatic for Lacan: the
functioning of the signifier “entails” the subject, which, in his
view, is precisely an effect of references between signifiers. Just
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as S1 cannot be separated from S2—it wouldn’t be a master-
signifier if this were the case—so the S1 ← S2 relationship, as
an instance of signification, cannot be divorced from the subject
that it necessarily involves. Given the use of the signifier, an
enunciating position starting from which signifying articulation
takes place needs to be presumed. However, and crucially, this
position is never fully or adequately represented by any of the
signifiers that are thus articulated (Feyaerts and Vanheule, 2015).
To be sure: the S1← S2 relationship necessarily entails a subject,
not a whole or integrated subject however, but a subject split by
the incommensurability of the signifying process itself. In terms
of Lacan’s discourse of the master (Figure 1), this enunciating
subject is the $ that is concomitant with the articulation of
S2 and S1, which is what the upward (vertical and diagonal)
arrows starting from $ express. Indeed, Lacan makes a crucial
distinction between the enunciating subject ($)—that is, the
speaking subject—and the enunciated subject, the subject that
is spoken, produced via the articulations of the signifying chain
(S1→S2).
Let us risk an elementary example which may bring this idea
to life. When an individual occupies a role in relation to someone
else—say that of fatherhood in relation to a child—a set of
elementary signifiers is distributed. A master-signifier (“father”)
is assumed, and starting from this S1 an array of culturally related
signifiers is evoked (taking care, guiding the child, relating to
the mother. . . ). When in daily life interactions take shape, an
enunciated subject gets created (“Daddy says no; you have to
listen to me!”). Yet, typically people never identify completely
with the master-signifiers they assume. Next to being a father
the same individual may also identify as a “lover” in relation to a
partner, or as a “hooligan” in relation to friends; signifiers that are
not always compatible with the identification with fatherhood.
Moreover, concrete actions taken by the father don’t make up
a whole (one time he helps, another moment he screams at
the child). Nonetheless all these actions emanate from the same
person, which is what the concept of the divided enunciating
subject makes clear.
Indeed, the retroactive S1 ← S2 relationship is not to be
understood as of an exclusively intellectual sort, or as limited
to the field of purely linguistic signification. This relationship
needs rather to be grasped as pertaining to signification in a far
more encompassing sense. Signification here includes not just
instances of propositional knowledge, but types of expertise or
practical “know how” (as in the distinction between connaissance
and savoir, respectively). The point is worth reiterating: for
Lacan, knowledge (S2) in its relation to a master-signifier (S1)
is meant also in the sense of savoir faire. Importantly, both
such forms of knowing rely on the rudimentary differentiation
between signifiers—that is, a minimal differential element—
required by all forms of knowing. We might consider a basic
example: a hungry infant fumbling at the mother’s breast, trying
to find the nipple. There is a rudimentary sort of signification
(or comprehension) occurring here; in differentiating the nipple
from other parts of the breast the infant “knows” something: how
to go about feeding. S1← S2 can thus be said to extend to a wide
range of ostensibly non-linguistic or practical forms of knowing-
how beyond the realm of propositional knowledge. In both such
cases the knowing in question can be conceived as precisely a
relation between signifiers.
“DIALECTICIZING” THE
MASTER-SIGNIFIER
From a clinical perspective what matters is not simply to spot a
master-signifier in the speech of a patient—that is easy enough—
but to query the particular role this signifier plays for them. We
need ask: what task is being performed by this signifier, and,
more pointedly, what is being elided, or repressed—by the S1←
S2 relation? The clinical literature makes this point of emphasis
quite clear. “[M]aster signifiers,” says Bailly (2009), “have become
quite detached from their signifieds” so as to
carry out the function of changing the meaning of the signifying
chain into one that supports the ego. It is one of the main tasks
of analysis to. . . bring to light the side of them [master-signifiers]
hidden in the unconscious” (p. 64).
“[I]n the analytic situation” says Fink (1995), “a master-signifier
presents itself as a dead end, a stopping point..[it is] a term,
a word, or phrase that puts an end to association, that grinds
the patient’s discourse to a halt” (p. 135). The contrast between
examples drawn from the political literature and the clinic is here
apparent: in the former, master-signifiers represent an apparent
over-flow of meaning; in the clinic they are typically the point
where signification stalls, where meaning closes down. One of
the chief goals of analysis is thus to “dialectize” master-signifiers
which freeze the enunciating subject; the objective is to clear
the blockage, to shift the relation of domination imposed by
S1s. It is in line with this conceptualization that Fink refers to
the master-signifier as “subjugating the subject” (p. 78), as “the
signifier that commands or [acts as] commandment” (p. 135). It
is by bringing master-signifiers into relation with other signifiers,
signifiers that may shift the given locked (S1→S2) relation, by
turning “dead ends. . . into through streets” (p. 78), that one
succeeds in “dialectizing” the master-signifier. One likewise aims
at “dialectizing” the enunciated subject that gets articulated along
the lines of the S1. Returning to our discussion of Mandela, we
might ask: what other narratives of the emergence of the post-
apartheid nation might be possible; what other accounts might
take us beyond the horizon of Mandela-associated meanings?
More revealing yet, perhaps: why the need to subscribe to the
Mandela myth, and what might this myth conceal?
We need to pay careful attention to Fink’s terminology. The
fundamental structure of signification, as we have seen, entails
the establishment of a link between a master-signifier and other
signifiers, a link furthermore which ensures that—Fink (1995)
uses a neutral term here—subjectification takes place. By linking
S1 to S2, $ gets created. When the master-signifier is isolated,
difficult to dialectize, when a S1→S2 relationship is locked, “it
subjugates the subject”: the enunciated subject then covers and
hides the evanescent enunciating subject. Yet, when it is linked
up with a new or disruptive set of signifiers, subjectivization
results, and an enunciating subject that does not coincide with its
previous utterances comes to the fore. A successful analysis could
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be said to pivot on the difference between these two modes of the
subject: on the movement from subjugation to subjectivization.
To recapitulate:
[In analysis] one tries to introduce an outside. . . of this S1. . . If
we can bring this S1 into some other kind of relation with
[surrounding signifiers]. . . then its status as a master-signifier
subjugating the subject changes. A bridge is built between it and
another linguistic element. . . the analysand is no longer stuck
at that particular point of his or her associations. . .A meaning
of the master-signifier is created. . . the subject is once again
split. . . having come to be momentarily in the forging of a link
between S1 and S2 (Fink, p. 78).
It is the creation of a new relationship between a given S1
and other signifying elements “which allows for a subjective
position” (Fink, p. 78). What is crucial to grasp here is that
this subject does not transcend their status as the split subject
of the unconscious. The subject cannot bypass or supersede
the division which, after all, is, for psychoanalysis, constitutive
of the subject as such (hence Fink’s reference to the subject
being “once again split” (p. 78) through the act of enunciation).
If anything, the split is realized in a more pronounced way.
Yet this is precisely what psychoanalysis is all about, peering
deeper into, confronting, the constitutive split that is the subject,
and considering alternative—less subjugated yet nevertheless
divided—forms of subjectivization that become possible in the
process.
THE UNENUNCIATED ASPECT
Master-signifiers then do not only anchor meanings and fix the
nodal-points of a given discourse; they also structurally repress
other signified meanings through, for example, the subject’s
insistence that “‘this is the way things are,’ that it is not subject
to challenge or dissent” (Parker, 2005, p. 170). The very process
of discursive insistence—be it in the endless reiteration of the
master-signifier or in the self-referring circularity upon which
it depends—effectively shuts down differing interpretations and
dissent (Parker, 2005).
While, for Bailly (2009) master-signifiers are the very
backbone of the human subject, “they are also, perhaps in
negative form (in the sense of the negative of a photograph),
the stuff of denegation” (p. 61). Master-signifiers, furthermore,
“usually mask their opposites. . . they exist in a polarized form”
(p. 63). The openly expressed aspect of the master-signifier
props up an ego—that is, the imagined identity of a subject
or community—while the enunciating or unenunciated aspect
remains “buried in the unconscious. . . constantly pushing up its
opposite number” (p. 63). The function of the master-signifier
is thus to redirect potentially painful or anxiety-provoking
signifiers, and to do so in such a way “that a signifying chain with
the opposite, bearable, or even comforting meaning emerges” (p.
63). The critical injunction suggested by Bailly’s comments is
vital, namely the idea that we investigate the negated opposite or
underside of a given master-signifier, that we ask ourselves what
the master-signifier holds at bay and keeps beyond the domain of
the thinkable?
How then to understand this unennuciated aspect in respect
of the massive proliferation of commemorative practices that
took place in South Africa around the time of Mandela’s death?
The intuitive response would be to say that these significations
celebrated Mandela’s life, affirmed all that he had achieved. Then
again, following the insight that master-signifiers often mask
their opposites, we might adopt a different hypothesis. Contrary
to assuming that the endless profusion of Mandela signifiers
speaks to the historical objectivity of the Mandela legacy, it
is worth wondering whether this activity is fueled rather by a
fantasy, a need to believe. The symbolic density connoted by
such activities and representations is a clear signal that a society
is fortifying a mode of belief, concretizing a cherished set of
ideals and subjective/societal investments. In short: we don’t erect
monuments simply to celebrate and affirmwhat we already know;
we build and sustain monuments so that we will continue to
know and believe what may otherwise be erased through time
and through various forms of uncertainty or doubt.
We might question then whether this commemorative
impulse was propelled by the immanent failure of, or disbelief
in, the vision of an integrated South Africa that Mandela
championed, and, furthermore, whether this multitude
of symbolic gestures attempted—desperately perhaps—to
affirm such a unified social reality, despite the mounting
evidence of growing social and political division. The surge
of commemorative practices perhaps indicated then less the
absolute truth of the political changes Mandela helped bring
about, than the fact that without the constant activity of Mandela
signification, South Africans feared they might fail to believe in
such changes—promised or otherwise—and begin to fear that
many of the country’s old divisions might resurface.
This speculative exercise sheds some light on the role of
the master-signifier in bolstering an ego-affirming fantasy and
concealing far less consoling signifiers. We can extend this by
asking how Mandela operates also as a site of repression. Posel’s
(2014) recent discussion of the politics of spectacle in post-
apartheid South Africa proves an invaluable resource here. A
crucial part of Posel’s analysis concerns the controversial figure
of Julius Malema, the “angry, unruly bad boy of post-apartheid
politics” (p. 32) who Posel positions as a type of “negative
Mandela”:
Malema entered the public sphere as a counterpoint to
Nelson Mandela—unsettling the iconography of non-racialism,
reasserting an angry and confrontational version of race that
reinstated the specter of violent conflagration that Mandela’s
‘miracle’ held at bay (p. 32).
The dynamic between the portrayals of these men has a clear
historical dimension inasmuch as it invokes an unprocessed past,
and the theme of repression, although not described in overtly
psychoanalytic language, is clearly present:
juxtaposing the spectacular public life of Julius Malema. . .with
that of Nelson Mandela draws attention to. . . the ‘haunting’
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presence of the past. . . If the mythic Mandela championed the
project of ‘national reconciliation’—his symbolic powers put to
the work of performing ‘non-racialism’—Malema emerged as
the symbolic counterpoint, marking the limits of this project: a
ghostly reminder of the abiding racial wounds that have endured
(p. 35).
So while it is true that the mythic Mandela is both “the condition
and counterpoint of Malema’s public persona” (p. 35), Posel’s
further descriptions suggests also a type of negation, even—as
in the above references to the haunting presence of the past—a
return of the repressed:
If Mandela was the national archetype of adult wisdom, the
Black man willing to reconcile and embrace fellowWhite citizens,
Malema styled himself as the quintessentially angry Black man:
youthful militant refusing to cow-tow to his political elders,
masculinist “revolutionary,” avowedly confrontational on racial
issues (p. 39).
While an apt characterization, “symbolic counterpart” does not
quite do justice to the dynamic underlying the relationship
between these signifiers. Malema, we might venture, is the
repressed truth of Mandela3. Malema emerges as the underside,
the return of what was so effectively repressed by Mandela4. The
remarkable success of Mandela as master-signifier may be said
to have much to do—particularly for white South Africa—with
what it kept at bay, namely, all that today is signified by the name
Malema. In this sense, it is not only—to invert Posel’s argument—
that Mandela be seen as a condition of possibility for Malema,
but Malema, or what Malema signifies, that acts as a condition of
possibility for Mandela.
CONCLUSION
As we hope is by now apparent, our objective here has not
been to discredit political and sociological applications of the
master-signifier concept. This literature usefully stresses how
3There is a nice formal bridge here at the level of the signifier, which will not go
unnoticed by Lacanians: Mandela and “Malema” are near homonyms.
4Consider the historical context provided by Posel; surveys in the 1990’s: showed
rising levels of White fear at the prospect of an escalating violent conflagration—
reinstating the longstanding specter of the angry Black mob. . . the dreaded
prospect of Black insurrection against White minority rule that had dominated
the White collective imagination since apartheid’s inception (2014, p. 49).
master-signifiers operate ideologically at the level of discourse
to engender effects of hegemony, to knit together a field
of discursive elements, and thus to consolidate forms of
mass identification. In all of these ways, we stand to benefit
from this literature. That being said, this literature does
sometimes run the risk of equating the master-signifier
with the processes of discursive hegemony in ways which
overlook—or underplay—the role of unconscious dynamics of
repression5.
Reference to the clinical literature shows how the master-
signifier operates also as a psychical—and not merely
discursive—function, and does so at the level of the subject,
in accordance with a libidinal economy, to defensively bolster
an ego, and to mobilize effects of fantasy and repression. Any
adequate analysis of a master-signifier needs to consider not
only apparent overflows of meaning, but also those points where
meaning seizes up and associations are halted; not only how
multiple meanings come to be articulated under the ascendency
of a hegemonic signifier, but the various repressed and negated
signifiers—the unenunciated and unarticulated—that the
master-signifier as ego-function routinely elides6. Simply put: the
master-signifier is not a properly psychoanalytic concept if it fails
to take into account the role of desire, which is inevitably also
to consider the unconscious and the multiple defenses that arise
around it.
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